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1 Introduction
Country boundaries have been in ux for a long time. For instance, the number
of internationally recognized countries has grown from 74 in 1945 to 193 in 2007
(Spolaore, 2008). Some of these new countries have been born following a peaceful
separation from larger blocks: this has been the case recently with the breaking-up
of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, or with the separation of Slovenia from
Yugoslavia. In many other cases, secession attempts have been less than peaceful,
with sometimes bloody secession crises, such as with Bosnia, Chechnya, Croatia,
Eritrea, Kosovo, South Sudan or Timor Leste. Other, less recent violent secession
episodes include Ireland, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, etc. There are also many
countries where secession, although not (yet) attempted, is at least talked about.
Prominent examples include Belgium, Spain, Canada, etc. Gurr (2000) states that,
between 1985 and 1999, secessionist movements were present in at least 52 countries.
From this panorama, we gather that there are three main ways a country subject
to internal secessionist tensions may respond. One possibility is for the majority1 to
try to accommodate and placate the minority in order to prevent it from attempting
to secede.2 This is the route taken for now by Spain and Canada with, respectively,
Catalonia and Quebec, for instance. If accommodation is not attempted or fails to
assuage the disgruntled minority, secession attempts may be either fought by the
majority (resulting in a violent secession crisis) or accepted, leading to a peaceful
separation. The objective of this paper is to understand what determines which of
these three outcomes emerges in countries experiencing secessionist tensions.
The economic literature has focused on the incentives to secede by a minority
inside a country  i.e., Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Goyal and Staal (2004), Le
Breton and Weber (2003, 2004), Haimanko et al. (2005, 2007), and Drèze et al.
(2007), to name a few. Many contributions have adopted a cost-benet approach:
factors that make secession more protable to the minority (self-determ-ination or
government closer to the people,support of neighboring state, ...) should increase
the risk of secession, while factors that make secession more costly to the minor-
ity (economic losses, security, international hostility, ...) should reduce it. This
approach is also very popular within political science (as exemplied by the contri-
butions of, e.g., Bartkus 1999, Birch 1978, Gourevitch 1979 and Horowitz 1981) and
sociology (see Hechter 1992 and references therein).
These contributions (which we dub CCB, for classical cost-benet approach) ab-
stract from decisions by the majority either to preempt secession by accommodating
the minority, or to either ght or accept secession once it is attempted. In order
to incorporate those decisions, we build on Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Their
1From now on, we assume, in line with most of the empirical evidence, that the group tempted
by secession forms a minority of the country.
2See Lustick et al. (2004).
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model appears to be particularly well suited to our purpose, for it nicely captures
the trade-o¤ between the cultural benets and the economic costs of secession. We
adapt this model in order to study how the majority takes these secession incentives
into account when deciding whether to prevent, accept or ght a secession attempt
by the minority.
In this paper, citizens belong to one of two regions of di¤erent sizes. They
di¤er according to their most-preferred type of a public good associated with the
functioning of a country, with individualsutility decreasing in the distance between
most-preferred and majority chosen type of public good. The distributions of most-
favoured types di¤er from one region to the other, and may be overlapping. By
seceding, a region can ensure that the type of the public good better ts its members
tastes: ideological considerations favour secession. On the other hand, economic
factors run against secession, because of returns to scale in the provision of the
public good provided by the government. The trade-o¤ between these two forces
determines both how willing the minority region is to secede, and how willing the
majority region is to accommodate the other region to prevent it from seceding.
The timing of the model we study runs as follows. In a rst stage, a national
vote is organized over the type of the national public good (called government
hereafter). In a second stage, voters in the minority region decide (also by majority
voting) whether they wish to secede. If a minority of voters in this region favours
secession, the process ends and the rst stage national choice is implemented. If
the minority region decides to secede, the majority region then chooses whether
to oppose this attempt or not. An unopposed secession attempt results in the
peaceful creation of two separate countries. A decision by the majority region to
oppose secession results in a costly secession crisis with an uncertain outcome, with
the attempt succeeding with some (exogenous) probability.3 In the case secession
occurs (with or without a ght by the majority region), a nal vote is organized in
each of the two regions (now, countries) to determine their governments type. If
the attempt is not successful, a new national vote is undertaken under the premise
that no future secession attempt is credible.
We now o¤er a preview of our results and of how they di¤er from those obtained
in the CCB approach. We rst identify the circumstances under which the majority
region ghts a secession attempt rather than accepting a peaceful separation. Al-
though this question has not been asked in the CCB literature, results intuitively
conform with the cost-benet approach: ghting is preferred if the cost associated to
a secession crisis is low (for instance because the probability of a successful secession
conict is small) or if the benet from country unity is large. Interestingly, the ma-
3See Hechter (1992, p267): Secession is successful when this withdrawal (from a central political
authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status) is
accorded recognition by the host state and by others in the inter-national community.
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jority ghts a secession by the minority not because it likes the unied governments
type (since a successful secession by the minority would also allow the majority to
choose a governments type closer to its preferences) but to keep the returns to scale
associated to a unied country.
We then focus on the choice between accommodation and repression by the ma-
jority region. A major di¤erence between our model and the CCB approach is that,
although we have in common that the agent with the median location is decisive
when voting over the national governments type, our setting predicts accommoda-
tion in the sense that this individual may favor a governments type that is biased in
the direction preferred by the minority. More precisely, accommodation is represen-
ted by a threshold of governments type, indicating how much the decisive national
voter is ready to depart from the median location in order to prevent the minority
from seceding. Similarly, the willingness to secede is given by another threshold,
indicating what it the worst type that the minority is ready to accept rather than
attempting secession. The comparison between these two thresholds determines
both whether accommodation by the majority prevents a secession attempt by the
minority, and what policy is implemented when accommodation occurs at equilib-
rium.
We nally restrict the (overlapping or not) regional distributions of preferences
to be uniform, in order to perform the comparative static analysis of both the equi-
librium governments type and of the equilibrium risk of secession (as measured by
the di¤erence between the two above-mentioned thresholds) with respect to sev-
eral parameters: the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the intra-regional
heterogeneity of preferences, the relative weight attached by voters to economic
(centripetal) as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological factors, the relative size of
the minority region, and the probability that a secession attempt is successful.
In our model with anticipation of the risk of secession, the policy decision in
case no secession is attempted is a¤ected in non trivial ways by the parameters
mentioned above (unlike in the CCB approach where it is given by the median
national location). It becomes more accommodating of the minority (i.e., moves
closer to the minority regions median favored policy) following an increase in either
the relative size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt is
successful, or the preference heterogeneity in the majority region. It also becomes
more accommodating when either the relative weight put on economic factors or
the preference heterogeneity in the minority region decrease. Interestingly, cultural
diversity across regions renders this national policy more accommodating of the
minority provided that the probability that a secession conict is successful is large.
Our approach, by stressing that a secession decision depends on the interplay
between the willingness of the minority to secede and of the national decisive voter
to accommodate, sheds lights on the risk of secession in a more complex way than
the CCB approach which focuses only on the rst ingredient. We show that a larger
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cultural diversity across regions increases the risk of secession because it decreases
more the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter than the will-
ingness of the minority region to secede. Raising the relative weight put by voters
on economic (as opposed to cultural) matters increases the willingness of the ma-
jority to accommodate while decreasing the minority regions willingness to secede,
resulting in an intuitive decrease of the risk of secession. Increasing the preference
heterogeneity inside the majority (resp., minority) region increases (resp., decreases)
both the willingness to secede and to accommodate, resulting in a smaller (resp.,
larger) risk of secession. Finally, raising either the relative size of the minority region
or the probability that a secession attempt is successful increases both the willing-
ness of the majority to accommodate the minority, and the willingness of the latter
to secede, with an ambiguous impact on the equilibrium risk of secession.
Although the literature on policy-making under the threat of secession is now
too large for us to give an exhaustive survey here,4 we should briey discuss the
papers relationship to the most closely related contribution by Spolaore (2008).
The objective of that paper is to study under what conditions regions divert costly
resources to ght each other over political borders. Spolaore (2008) and our paper
have in common that we model a two-region setting where the decisions by the
minority to secede and by the majority to ght or not secession are driven by the
same trade-o¤ between returns to scale and heterogeneity of preferences. However,
Spolaore (2008) focuses on the cost of conict and does not allow the majority to
accommodate the minority, but only to ght more or less intensively its secession
attempt. On the other hand, we focus on accommodation versus repression, but
have little to say on how much resources are devoted by the two regions to the
secession conict.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of voting under
the risk of secession, and discusses our key assumptions. Section 3 solves the model
while section 4 performs the comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium policy
and risk of secession. Finally, section 5 concludes by confronting our results to the
existing empirical evidence.
2 A Simple Model of Secession Crises
We consider a country populated by a continuum of citizens of total mass one.
Citizens belong to one of two regions which we label A and B. Let 1    and
 stand for the proportion of the country population residing in region A and B,
respectively. We assume w.l.o.g. that  < 1=2, so that region B is the minority
region.
4A non-exhaustive list would include Buchanan and Faith (1987), Bolton and Roland (1997),
Olofsgård (2003, 2004), Gradstein (2004), and Morelli and Rohner (2010).
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A country needs a government, dened by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, p.1030)
as a bundle of administrative, judicial, economic services, and public policies,and
citizens di¤er in their preferences for the type of government provided. The set of
feasible governments types is represented by the interval [0; 1], and each citizens
location t on this interval represents her ideal governments type, with her utility
decreasing in the distance between ideal and chosen type.
In each region R 2 fA;Bg, citizenstypes are distributed over the interval [0; 1]
according to a c.d.f. Fa(tjR), where a 2 (a; a)  R++ is a parameter measuring
cultural distinctiveness between regions. The distribution of ideal policies in the
country is then given by
Fa;(t)  (1  )Fa(tjA) + Fa(tjB) .
Throughout the paper, we assume that:
(i) Fa(tjA)  Fa(tjB), for all t 2 [0; 1];
(ii) (Regional and national) median types are unique: there exist tA, tB, and tm in
[0; 1] such that
F 1a (f1=2gjR) =

tR
	
, 8R 2 fA;Bg , and F 1a; (f1=2g) = ftmg .
Furthermore, they satisfy tA < tm < tB and 2tm  tA + tB.
(iii) For all t 2 [0; 1], Fa(tjA) [resp. Fa(tjB)] is an increasing [resp. decreasing]
nonconstant function of a;
(iv) lima!a Fa(0jA) = 1  lima!a Fa(1jB) = 1.
A few comments are in order. Observe that we allow for the regional distributions
of preferences to overlap. That is, contrary to Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and the
subsequent literature, we do not assume that the geographical and the preference
dimensions necessarily coincide. We assume that, whatever the governments type
considered, the fraction of people with preferences to the left of this location is at
least as large in region A than in region B (condition (i) above). Condition (ii) as-
sumes that (regional and national) median types are unique, and that the nationwide
median voter, tm, is closer to region As median voter, tA, than to his counterpart
in region B, tB. This assumption can be considered as the political complement to
the size assumption that  < 1=2: region A is dominant in the country both in pure
head count terms, but also in terms of median preferences (observe that none of the
two assumptions implies the other one). Finally, condition (iii) shows what we mean
by cultural distinctiveness: increasing a pushes the regional preference distributions
apart, with the limit case in (iv) of a totally polarized society. Observe that an
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individual of type tm always exists in region A, and may exist in region B provided
that the two regional distributions overlap su¢ ciently.
The nancial cost of implementing a government is independent of its type and
is given by g.5 Government is a pure public good, so that g is independent of the
size of the jurisdiction. We further assume that this cost is equally shared among
all citizens under the governments jurisdiction.
We consider two possible institutional arrangements. In the rst one, the country
remains unied and a single governments type x is implemented. In that case, the
utility of an individual located at t for a government of type x is given by
cu   jx  tj ;
where cu  y   g depicts the consumption level of an individual of income y after
nancing the cost of government g.6
In the second arrangement, secession occurs and a government has to be provided
in each of the two regions. Citizens consume the services of the government provided
in the region they reside in, and citizens of a region nance equally the cost of their
regions government. If we denote by xR region Rs governments type (R 2 fA;Bg),
the utility of a citizen of type t residing in this region R is given by
cSR   jxR   tj ;
where
cSA  y 
g
1   and c
S
B  y 
g

depict the consumption level of an individual of income y after nancing the cost of
government g in her own region A and B, respectively.
This formulation is the simplest one encompassing the main trade-o¤ at play
between the two institutional arrangements studied: secession allows both regions
to enact a governments type closer to the preferences of the regions inhabitants,
while preventing citizens from enjoying the returns to scale associated with a single
national government.7 We denote the economic loss for citizens in region R that
occurs with secession as cR  cu   csR > 0, for each R 2 fA;Bg.
Events unfold as follows:
5We assume that this cost a proxy for the size of government is exogenous. See De Donder
et al. (2009) for the joint political determination of the size and type of government.
6With lump sum nancing of the public good, the (exogenous) income distribution and its
correlation with preferences do not matter.
7The economic gains of a large country are summarized in our model by the fact that the per
capita costs of the public good decrease with the number of people who enjoy it. Alesina and
Spolaore (1997) list other economic gains: larger countries rely more heavily on more e¢ cient
forms of taxation, they benet from larger markets (in a world with less than perfect trade), and
their exposure to uninsurable shocks is smaller than for smaller countries.
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Stage 1. Citizens in the whole country choose by majority voting the type of
the national government, x 2 [0; 1].
Stage 2. A vote is taking place among region Bs citizens to determine whether
they want to secede or not. If a majority of region Bs citizens favor secession,
then a secession attempt occurs. Otherwise, the country remains united with a
governments type of x, and the citizens receive their nal payo¤.8
Stage 3. If a secession was attempted in Stage 2, region A chooses (through
majority voting) whether to ght to prevent the breaking up of the country or not.
Stage 4. If a majority of region As citizens vote to ght the secession attempt
by region B, this secession attempt is successful with probability  2 [0; 1] and
the citizens in both regions R incur a per capita monetary cost of conict R > 0;
0 < A  B, whether secession is successful or not.9 If a majority of region As
citizens prefer not to resist, separation occurs with probability one without any
conict cost.
If the secession attempt is successful (irrespective of the decision by region A
to resist the attempt or not), a vote takes place in each region to determine the
governments type in this region. If the secession attempt has been successfully
repressed, the country remains united and a new vote takes place to choose the
national governments type, but this time with no ensuing threat of secession.10
Finally, we will make use of the following tie-breaking assumption: Each citizen,
when indi¤erent between an alternative leading to continued unity and an alternative
leading to a secession crisis, always votes for the former in a pairwise comparison.
We now solve this model for the equilibrium institutional arrangement (unied
country or secession) and policies.
3 Equilibrium Policy and Risk of Secession
As is usual, we solve the model backward, starting with the decisions taken in the
last stages. If the secession attempt is successful, a vote takes place in both regions
8Note that, as we want to concentrate on the majoritys choice between accommodation and
repression, we follow the lead of the related literature (e.g., Lustick et al., 2004) and exclude the
(empirically rarely observed) possibility of secession by the majority group.
9This cost can be either a nancial cost incurred during the secession attempt or its repression
(monetary value of assets destroyed, opportunity cost of resources invested,...) or a monetary
measure of the intrinsic readiness of the region to either secede (for B) or repress secesssion (for
A), like the ability to bear social unrest linked to demonstrations, civil war, or the heightened hate
from members of the other group. The assumption that the per capita cost is larger for the citizens
residing in the seceding region is very reasonable, if only because most if not all secession conicts
occur in the seceding region, where most of the physical damage takes place.
10This assumption is made to simplify the algebra. Our results hold through qualitatively
provided that the secession threat is less prevalent than at stage 1, so that region A citizens
are less willing to accommodate the preference of the minority region.
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to determine the regional governments type. Preferences being single-peaked in x,
a Condorcet winner exists (i.e., an option that is favored by a majority of voters
to any other feasible option) and is given by the median most-preferred type in the
region, tR, R 2 fA;Bg. In the case secession is attempted but fails, the national
vote over the unique governments type results in the national median type, tm,
being selected as the unique Condorcet winner.
Moving up the sequence of events, we now study the voting decision by citizens
in region A as to whether to ght a secession threat by region B (stage 3). In
the case where region A does not ght, secession happens for sure, this regions
equilibrium governments type is tA but no citizen bears any transition cost A. If
region A chooses to ght, everyone in A supports a secession cost A which results in
a lottery between policy tA in a smaller country, or policy tm in the unied country.
A citizen located at t in region A then prefers to repress a secession attempt by
region B if and only if


csA  
tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A  csA   tA   t . (1)
Observe rst that this condition is independent of the value of x chosen in the rst
stage, since this policy is not on the table anymore once this decision node has been
reached.
Intuitively, for all agents located between tA and tm, the incentive to oppose se-
cession increases with the individuals location, as this moves the individual closer to
the governments type chosen nationally, tm, and away from the type chosen region-
ally, tA. The incentive to oppose secession is minimum (and identical) for all agents
located to the left of tA, because the (negative) utility di¤erence between national
and regional governments type is minimum among region As inhabitants, and is
the same for all t  tA. Likewise, the incentive to oppose secession is maximum
(and identical) for all agents located to the right of tm, because the (positive) util-
ity di¤erence between national and regional governments type is maximum among
region As inhabitants, and is the same for all t  tm. This means that a majority
of region As citizens votes in favor of ghting region Bs secession attempt if and
only if the median regional type tA opposes secession, which is the case where
(F) A  (1  )
 
cA   (tm   tA)

.
Observe that, since all agents with t  tA have the same preference regarding the
attitude towards region Bs secession attempt, condition (F) actually ensures that
all agents in region A oppose the secession attempt by B. Very intuitively, region
As citizens are more likely to ght any attempt at secession by region B (meaning
that assumption (F) is easier to satisfy) if the cost of ghting, A, is low, if ghting
has a high probability to scuttle the secession attempt ( low), or if secession means
forgoing a large part of the returns to scale associated with a single country (cA
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large, because g or  are large). Perhaps less intuitively, condition (F) is easier
to satisfy when the policy di¤erences between the two regimes, tm   tA, becomes
smaller. This is due to the fact that, to obtain a majority in favor of ghting region
Bs secession attempt, we need to convince individuals located at tA, who actually
prefer the policy type when secession is not fought (tA) to the one enacted when the
secession attempt is fought and fails (tm). A smaller policy di¤erence then makes it
easier to induce these individuals to vote in favor of repressing secession. In other
terms, individuals located at tA ght secession not in order to induce a governments
type tm, but rather to keep the returns to scale associated to the unied country.
Indeed, straightforward algebra shows that the right hand side of (F) is positive only
if g is large enough (i.e., if returns to scale do matter enough).
As we are interested in the choice between accommodation of the minority pref-
erences (stage 1) and repression, cases in which the majority region is prepared to
repress secession attempts are our primary interest; so we assume in the remainder
of the paper that (F) holds.11 It is readily checked, however, that all our theoret-
ical results can be adapted to the case of peaceful secession by setting  = 1 and
A = B = 0 in what follows.
We then move backward to stage 2 and study the secession attempt decision
by region B. In case region B does not attempt to secede, a national government
of type x is implemented. If it attempts to secede, region Bs citizens anticipate
that region A will ght this attempt and that they will su¤er a secession cost B,
resulting in the following lottery: enjoying the returns to scale of a large country
with a governments type tm, or living in a smaller jurisdiction with a governments
type of tB. A citizen t in region B prefers her region attempting secession if and
only if


csB  
tB   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  B  cu   jx  tj .
Incentives to secede increase the closer a region Bs citizen is to tB and the further
away she is from x, and are then maximum for citizens t  tB.12 We then have that
a majority in region B favours secession if and only if
x  x    tB  cB+ (1  )tm   B < tB,
where the threshold x denotes the minimum value of the national governments type
such that a majority in region B does not attempt to secede (anticipating that region
A will ght this secession attempt). This threshold value of x is then a measure
of region Bs willingness to secede. Intuitively, this willingness (i) decreases with
11The case where (F) is not satised corresponds to peaceful secessions/separations, which seem
empirically to be much less prevalent than repressed secession attempts (Walter, 2009).
12We assume for the moment that x < tB i.e., that the national choice is never to the right of
region Bs median location. We come back to this assumption in the next footnote.
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the cost to attempt secession, B, (ii) increases when the median voter in region B,
tB, becomes more extreme or when the policy cost of a botched secession attempt
decreases because tm increases, and (iv) decreases when the loss of the returns to
scale associated with secession, cB, becomes larger.
We dene the secession set S as the set of policies such that region B attempts
to secede when x is chosen in the rst stage.13 Moving to the rst stage choice of x,
we assume that the secession threat by region B is binding  i.e., that the majority
chosen policy in the absence of a secession threat, tm, belongs to the secession set:
A1: tm 2 S (, tm < x).
If this assumption were not satised, the country would always remain united
with the governments type located at tm.
We can write the rst stage policy preferences of a citizen t living in region R as
follows
vR(x; t) 



csR  
tR   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  R if x 2 S ,
cu   jx  tj otherwise. (2)
Observe that vR(x; t) does not depend upon x provided that x 2 S, since in that
case the minority region attempts to secede so that the implemented policy is either
tR (if secession works out) or tm (if the attempt fails).
We prove the following lemma in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. A Condorcet winner always exists when voting on x in stage 1.
(i) If vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) for all x 2 S, then x is the unique Condorcet winner;
(ii) otherwise, either the set of Condorcet winners coincides with S or x is the
unique Condorcet winner. In particular, there exists a0 2 [a; a] such that the set of
Condorcet winners coincides with S whenever a  a0.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that a su¢ cient (although not neces-
sary) condition for the (national) median citizen tm in region A to be decisive (in the
sense that a majority-winning alternative must maximize her utility) is that cultural
distinctiveness is su¢ ciently large. Figure 1 depicts her preferences in two di¤erent
cases. The dotted line represents her utility as a function of x when the country
13Coming back to the previous footnote, there exists a value of x, which we denote by x^, such that
x > x^ > tB induces a majority of region B to secede. Formally, S  fx 2 [0; 1] : x < x or x > x^g.
This corresponds to the pathological case where the national policy x is so extreme that the least
extreme members of region B prefer to secede in order to implement the less extreme policy tB
rather than x. Allowing for this possibility does not change our results but treating it explicitly
would increase the length of the paper without adding any intuition, so we concentrate on the
cases where x < x^ in the remainder of the paper.
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remains united (second line in (2)) while the horizontal line represents her utility
level when region B attempts to secede (the rst line in (2), which is independent of
x). The bold line represents her utility as a function of x when region Bs secession
decision is anticipated. The left panel corresponds to case (i) in the statement of
Lemma 1, and the right panel to case (ii).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
In the rst case, x beats all alternatives outside of S (i.e., such that no secession
is attempted) with the support of citizens located to the left of x (who form a
majority thanks to A1), and beats all alternatives in S with the support of citizens
located to the right of the median tm. In the second case, any alternative in S beats
any alternative not in S with the support of region As citizens located to the left of
tm. Observe that this need not be the case for region Bs citizens of similar location
if the utility they obtain in S is lower than for a region As citizen of identical
location, which may be the case since region B is smaller than region A, and since
the secession crisis cost R is larger in region B than in A. We show in the proof of
Lemma 1 that a su¢ ciently large cultural distinctiveness between regions results in
a (national) majority of people, all located in region A, preferring any alternative in
S to any alternative not in S. Finally, if the regional preference distributions do not
overlap, than citizens of type tm are all located in region A, and are always decisive
when voting on x.
Observe that, if the national median voter in region A is not decisive, then
secession is never an equilibrium of this model. In order to focus on the interesting
and empirically relevant situations, we assume from now on that secession may
occur at equilibriumi.e., that type tm in region A is decisive when voting on x. As
explained above, a su¢ cient condition for this is that14
A2: a  a0.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is that unity is maintained at equi-
librium (in which case x is enacted) if and only if tm prefers unity under x to a
secession crisis:
cu   jx  tmj   csA   tA   tm+ (1  )cu   A ,
14Although it is possible to nd overlapping regional preference distributions such that type tm
in A is not decisive, these distributions (available upon request from the authors) actually look
very cooked up.
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mt x x
 mA tv ,
mt x x
Figure 1: Policy preferences of the median citizen living in region A.
 mA tv ,
or, equivalently,
x  y  cA + (1 + )tm   tA + A . (3)
The above expression captures nicely the two di¤erent sets of incentives in our
model: x summarizes the incentives to secede of the minority, while y measures
the willingness of the national decisive voter to accommodate region Bs preferences
(since y is the maximum value of x that this voter is willing to implement in order to
prevent region B from attempting secession). The equilibrium institutional arrange-
ment and governments type depend upon the comparison of these two thresholds,
as summarized by
Proposition 1. A secession attempt is avoided at equilibrium if and only if

 
tB  cB
  B    cA   tA+ 2tm + A . (4)
If this condition is satised, the implemented governments type is x for the whole
unied country. If it is not, secession is attempted by region B and the equilibrium
policy corresponds to tm for the whole country with probability 1  (failed attempt),
and to tR in region R with probability  (successful attempt).
We now turn to the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium.
4 Comparative Static Analysis of the Equilibrium
Proposition 1 describes the conditions under which no secession attempt is made,
because the decisive national median is ready to accommodate the minority while
simultaneously region B can be convinced not to secede. The ease with which
secession can be prevented can be represented by   y   x, which measures the
length of the range of policies that (i) do not induce region B to secede and (ii)
are preferred by the decisive national voter to the expected outcome in case of a
secession attempt. We then assume that the equilibrium secession risk is decreasing
in .15
We now perform the comparative static analysis of equilibrium policy and seces-
sion risk with respect to the parameters of the model: the cultural distinctiveness
of the two regions, the intra-regional preference heterogeneity, the relative weight
attached by voters to economic (centripetal) as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological
factors, the relative size of the two regions, and the probability that a secession
15We can show (notes available upon request to the authors) that our setting in this paper is
formally equivalent (under certain conditions) to another where there is uncertainty as to the cost
of secession for region B, B , and where the equilibrium probability that this region attempts to
secede is an increasing function of .
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attempt is successful. Put di¤erently, we study how the set of parameters for which
(4) holds changes when these factors change, and how the equilibrium policy x is
a¤ected.
To address these questions precisely and ease the comparative statics, we assume
that Fa(jA) and Fa(jB) are of the form:
Fa(tjA) 
8<:
0 if t 2 [0; 1  a  A) ;
t+a+A 1
2A
if t 2 [1  a  A; 1  a+ A] ;
1 if t 2 (1  a+ A; 1] ,
Fa(tjB) 
8<:
0 if t 2 [0; a  B) ;
t a+B
2B
if t 2 [a  B; a+ B] ;
1 if t 2 (a+ B; 1] ,
where a > a = 1=2, and R  1  a, R 2 fA;Bg. In words, the regional preference
distributions are assumed to be uniform, with the distribution in region A (resp.,
B) distributed around 1  a (resp., a) with A (resp., B) measuring the dispersion
around the mean/median regional location (so that tA = 1 a and tB = a). Observe
that we allow the two distributions to overlap, which is the case if 1 a+A > a B
i.e., if the regional dispersions A and B are large enough and if the median
preferences in each region are close enough from each other. The nationwide median
voter is the value of tm that solves:
(1  ) tm+a+A 1
A
+  t
m a+B
B
 1 if 2a  
1 A + B + 1;
(1  ) tm+a+A 1
A
 1 otherwise.
The rst line above corresponds to the case where tm belongs to the overlapping
regional preferences segment (it is easy to see that the condition under which it
happens is stronger than the condition for overlap stated above). It is readily checked
that tm 2 (1  a; a), so that
tm 
(
(1 )B+a[A (1 )B ]
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
1 (1 A)
1    a otherwise.
4.1 Cultural distinctiveness of the two regions
Cultural distinctiveness between regions increases with the parameter a. It turns
out that the impact of cultural distinctiveness occurs through changes in the identity
of the decisive voters: raising a unambiguously decreases tA and increases tB. It also
decreases tm, provided that
A < (1  )B: (5)
This condition is intuitive: a larger value of a decreases tm provided that there are
few people in region B ( small) and that the preferences of these individuals are
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very thinly distributed around their median (B large). We assume from now on
that condition (5) is satised. Observe that it is always the case when the two
regional distributions do not overlap.
The impact of increasing cultural distinctiveness on the willingness of the minor-
ity to secede, as measured by x, is given by
dx
da
= 
d
 
tB   tm
da
+
dtm
da
=
(
 + (1  )A (1 )B
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
2   1 otherwise. .
On the one hand, raising a increases the distance between tB and tm, which
makes secession more appealing to region B in case of a successful attempt. On the
other hand, it decreases tm, which makes secession less appealing in case the attempt
is thwarted. In other words, increasing a raises the stakes associated to a secession
attempt by region B. The sign of the net impact of a on x is then ambiguous and
depends upon the success probability : if it is low enough, the latter e¤ect is larger
than the former and region B becomes less willing to secede, driving a decrease in
x. Keeping in mind that x corresponds to the implemented policy in case secession
is prevented (i.e., when   0), we then obtain that more cultural distinctiveness
between regions may lead to either a decrease or an increase in the equilibrium
policy, depending upon the success probability .
The impact of a larger cultural distinctiveness on the willingness of the national
decisive voter to accommodate secessionist trends, as measured by y, is given by
dy
da
=
dtm
da
+ 
d
 
tm   tA
da
=
(
 + (1 + )A (1 )B
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
 1 otherwise.
Increasing a has two e¤ects of opposite signs on y: (i) the decrease in the identity
of the decisive voter, the country median tm, tends to decrease y; (ii) the increase in
the distance between tm and tA increases the decisive voters utility cost of secession
and thus the need to compromise to prevent secession, tending to increase y. Observe
that the second e¤ect is present only if preferences overlap signicantly (i.e., tm
belongs to the interval where preferences overlap), so that y decreases unambiguously
if preferences do not overlap. In case of overlapping preferences, the second e¤ect
is smaller than the rst one provided that  is small enough, in which case the
overall impact of a on y is negative: increased cultural distinctiveness unambiguously
reduces the incentives of the national decisive voter to accommodate region B and
prevent secession.
We now look at the total e¤ect of increasing a on the equilibrium risk of secession,
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as measured by :
d
da
= 
 
 d
 
tA + tB

da
+ 2
dtm
da
!
=
(
2 A (1 )B
A+(1 )B < 0 if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
 2 < 0 otherwise.
This net e¤ect is unambiguously negative, showing that, even though the impact on
both equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted and on regionBs willingness
to secede is ambiguous, increasing the cultural distinctiveness across regions results
in a larger risk of secession.
We summarize those results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A larger cultural distinctiveness between countries increases the
risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium. The impact of cultural distinctiveness
on both the willingness to secede by region B and to accommodate by region A is
ambiguous, although it is negative in both cases provided that the probability of a
successful secession attempt, , is low enough.
4.2 Relative weight of economic versus cultural aspects
One can also look at the relative weight of economic versus cultural factors, which
is captured by g. In contrast to the previous section, increasing g does not a¤ect
the identity of the decisive (national or regional) voter, but rather increases the
economic loss associated to secession in both regions, cR. Intuitively, this decreases
the willingness of region B to secede,
dx
dg
=  dcB
dg
=  1  

< 0;
while it increases the willingness of the national decisive voter to accommodate,
dy
dg
= 
dcA
dg
= 

1   > 0;
resulting in a lower risk of secession at equilibrium,
d
dg
= 

dcA
dg
  dcB
dg

= 


1   +
1  


> 0 .
This is summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 3. Increasing the relative weight of economic versus cultural aspects
increases the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter, decreases the
willingness to secede of region B and thus decreases the risk of a secessionist conict
at equilibrium. The equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted becomes less
accommodating of the minority (i.e., moves closer to both the nationals and majority
regions median favored policies).
4.3 Relative size of the minority
Increasing the relative size of the minority region, , has three impacts: it moves
the identity of the national decisive voter to the right (i.e., closer to the median wish
in region B) while it decreases (resp., increases) the economic cost of secession for
region B (resp., A). We obtain that
dx
d
= (1 )dt
m
d
 dcB
d
=
(
g
2
  (1 )(1 2a)AB
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1 ,
g
2
+ (1 )A
(1 )2 > 0 otherwise.,
so that region B becomes more willing to secede since a larger  decreases the
policy cost of a failed secession attempt (since tm increases with ) and decreases
the economic cost of a successful secession attempt as well. We also have that
dy
d
= (1+)
dtm
d
+
dcA
d
=
(
g
(1 )2   (1+)(1 2a)AB[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1 ,
g+(1+)A
(1 )2 > 0 otherwise.
Raising  increases the willingness of the national decisive voter to accommodate
region B, because of two e¤ects playing in the same direction: a larger  (i) increases
the value of the decisive voters type tm, moving her closer to region Bs preferences,
and (ii) increases the economic cost of secession for tm.
With both x and y increasing with , the net impact on  is a priori ambiguous.
Straightforward manipulations tell us that
d
d
= 

dcA
d
+
dcB
d
+ 2
dtm
d

=
8<:  
h
(1 2)g
2(1 )2 +
2(1 2a)AB
[A+(1 )B ]2
i
if 2a  
1 A + B + 1 ,

h
2A
(1 )2   (1 2)g2(1 )2
i
otherwise.
so that the equilibrium risk of secession increases if  is low enough and/or g is
large enough. When  is very small, the economic impact of secession on region
Bs inhabitants decreases very fast with , which results in a lower  (and thus a
larger risk of secession). On the opposite, when  is large, the main driver is the
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economic loss for region A in case of a successful secession attempt (since the cost of
government g is to be shared by a smaller proportion 1   of nationals), so that the
risk of secession decreases. A large enough value of g is a necessary condition for an
increase in the risk of secession (because it amplies the variations in the economic
costs of secession when  increases). We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. As the relative size of the minority region, , increases:
(i) both the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter and the
willingness to secede of region B increase;
(ii) the equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted becomes more accom-
modating of the minority;
(iii) the risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium increases if  is small and/or
g is large.
4.4 Probability that a secession attempt is successful
Raising the probability that a secession attempt is successful intuitively results in
an increase in the willingness of region B to secede:
dx
d
= tB  cB   tm > 0
by assumption A1. In words, tB   tm represents the marginal policy gain for region
Bs decisive voter when a secession attempt becomes more successful, while cB
represents the marginal economic loss. The value of x increases with  if the marginal
gain is larger than the marginal loss, which is what assumption A1 implies.
Likewise, an increase in  induces the national median voter to be more willing
to accommodate region Bs preferences:
dy
d
= cA   tA + tm > 0:
The net impact on the risk of a secession attempt is then ambiguous:
d
d
= cA +cB  
 
tA + tB

+ 2tm
=
(
2+(1 )2
(1 ) g   (1 2a)[A (1 )B ]A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
2+(1 )2
(1 ) g   2(1 )a+(1 2A) 11  otherwise.
In countries where the weight attached to economic losses, g, is large, and cultural
distinctiveness, a, is low, raising the probability that a secession attempt is successful
tends to reduce the risk of a secession attempt. The e¤ect of the minoritys relative
size, , is ambiguous, for it has opposing e¤ects. First, it increases the median
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voters type, tm, thereby reducing (resp. raising) the policy gain of secession (resp.
of maintained unity) for the minority (resp. the median voter). Second, a change
in  also a¤ects the marginal economic losses of both regions: positively for region
A, and negatively for region B.
Proposition 5. As the probability that a secession attempt is successful, , in-
creases:
(i) both the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter and the
willingness to secede of region B increase;
(ii) the equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted becomes more accom-
modating of the minority; and
(iii) the risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium decreases if g is large and a
is low.
4.5 Heterogeneity inside regions
We start with Region A. The only impact of a larger heterogeneity in region A, A,
is to increase the identity of the national decisive voter, tm (this is intuitive, since a
larger heterogeneity increases the proportion of region As inhabitants with a most-
preferred type larger than any t > 1  a). This in turn increases the willingness of
region B to secede (since a failed secession attempt becomes less costly in policy
terms):
dx
dA
= (1  ) dt
m
dA
=
(
 (1  ) (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
(1 )
1  > 0 otherwise,
while it also increases the willingness of the majority to accommodate (because the
decisive voter moves to the right):
dy
dA
= (1 + )
dtm
dA
=
(
 (1 + ) (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
(1+)
1  > 0 otherwise.
We obtain that the impact on the willingness to accommodate is larger than on
the willingness to secede, so that the risk of a secession attempt decreases with
heterogeneity in region A:
d
dA
= 2
dtm
dA
=
(
 2 (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
2
1  > 0 otherwise.
We now move to region B, where we obtain the opposite impacts. More precisely,
increasing heterogeneity inside region B, B, decreases tm (when preferences overlap
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su¢ ciently there is no impact otherwise), which then decreases the willingness of
region B to secede,
dx
dB
= (1  ) dt
m
dB
=
(
(1  ) (1 2a)(1 )A
[A+(1 )B ]2 < 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
0 otherwise.
as well as the willingness of the majority to accommodate:
dy
dB
= (1 + )
dtm
dB
=
(
(1 + ) (1 2a)(1 )A
[A+(1 )B ]2 < 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
0 otherwise.
The latter e¤ect being larger than the former, increasing B results in a larger risk
of secession at equilibrium when preferences overlap signicantly, and no impact
otherwise:
d
dB
= 2
dtm
dB
=
(
2 (1 2a)(1 )A
[A+(1 )B ]2 < 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
0 otherwise.
We summarize those results in the next proposition:
Proposition 6. Increasing the heterogeneity of preferences inside region A (resp.,
B) results in an increase (resp., decrease) in both the willingness to secede by the
minority region and to accommodate by the majority, and in a smaller (resp., larger)
equilibrium risk of a secession attempt.
5 Empirical Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The framework developed here is a highly abstract model of secession crises. In our
view, it is also the simplest structure within which to analyze not only the decision
by a minority to secede (on which the existing literature has focused), but also the
decision by the majority whether to accommodate the minority in order to dissuade
secession, or to ght or accept a secession attempt by the minority.
The next step consists in confronting our predictions to data and empirical evid-
ence. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature has focused on the
determinants of secession crisis, without looking closely at what determines whether
the majority chooses to accommodate (and how much), accept or ght a secession at-
tempt. In other words, the empirical literature has focused on analyzing the factors
which a¤ect the probability that a secessionist conict takes place.
On this topic, it is interesting to contrast our predictions to those of the CCB
approach, and to confront them to the data. Our predictions di¤er on two counts:
the impact of the minority region size, and of the exogenous probability that a
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secession attempt is successful, on the equilibrium risk of secession. On the impact of
relative size, the CCB analysis obtains that a larger size of the minority decreases its
cost of secession and thus should result in a larger secession probability. Our analysis
shows that a larger minority size increases both the willingness to accommodate and
to secede, with an ambiguous impact on the resulting secession probability. The
empirical evidence on this matters seems more in line with our prediction, with
some papers nding a positive impact of relative size (Fearon and Laitin (1999))
while others (Saideman and Ayres (2000) and Sorens (2005)) nd no signicant
e¤ect.
We now move to the impact of the (exogenous) probability that a secession
attempt is successful on the risk of secession. For the CCB approach, a larger
probability decreases the cost of secession for the minority, resulting in a larger risk
of secession at equilibrium. In our model, a larger probability increases both the
willingness to accommodate and to secede, with an ambiguous net impact on the
risk of secession. Now, it is di¢ cult to nd a good proxy for this probability that
a secession attempt is successful, but we can nd in the empirical literature two
elements that have a positive impact on this probability: the support of neighboring
states, and the existence of a large diaspora from the same ethnic group as the
minority tempted by secession. According to the CCB approach, they should then
increase the risk of secession. This is not what is observed in the data. As for the
impact of a large diaspora, Boyle and Englebert (2006) state that there is still little
large-scale evidence of this link, for only Collier and Hoe­ er (2002) have found a
positive e¤ect of diasporas on separatism. Their measurement, however, was limited
to populations living in the United States, based on the 2000 census, which is likely
to be a biased estimate.As for the support of a neighboring state, the empirical
evidence suggests either no e¤ect (Fearon and Laitin 1999) or a negative one (Sorens
2005).
One important characteristic of our modelling is that it disentangles the impact
of cultural diversity between regions from those stemming from the heterogeneity
in preferences inside regions. These impacts are quite di¤erent: while both the
inter-regional diversity and the heterogeneity inside the minority region tend to in-
crease the risk of secession, the heterogeneity inside the majority region actually de-
creases the equilibrium risk of secession. Observe that the impacts of intra-regional
heterogeneity on the risk of secession are quite counter-intuitive (they are due to
variations in the willingness of the majority to accommodate the minoritys views
and prevents secession). The empirical literature has tested the claim that cultural
pluralism within a country will increase the number of secessionist claims.(Boyle
and Englebert, 2006, p.7). Unfortunately, this literature has not tried to disentangle
the impacts of inter- and intra-regional cultural pluralism. In the light of our model,
it is then no surprise that the evidence is rather weak if not contrarian, however.
Hale (2000) and Sorens (2005) nd positive relationships between ethnic/linguistic
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distinctiveness and separatist propensity. Yet, Treisman (1997:231), Laitin (2001:
852) and Saideman and Ayres (2000) found no evidence that ethnic antipathies or
attachments to ethnic identities are important determinants of separatism. Further,
Fearon and Laitin (1999) and Collier and Hoe­ er (2002) observed that social frac-
tionalization actually reduced the likelihood of identity wars and rebellions  as
it makes it less likely for a specic group to have a distinct and su¢ ciently large
regional(Boyle and Englebert, 2006, p.7).
Granted, this is at most tentative empirical evidence that our models predic-
tions, when they di¤er from those of the CCB approach, are more empirically relev-
ant. Or, in other words, that our model improves upon the CCB approach precisely
where the empirical evidence does not conform with their predictions. To go bey-
ond this rst impression, there is need not only for more empirical research on the
risk of secession, but more importantly on how much majorities accommodate their
unruly minorities, and of what determines whether a secession attempt is fought or
peacefully accepted by the majority.
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Suppose that vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) for all x 2 S. As the preferences of all
citizens are single-peaked on U  [0; 1] n S  with a peak at x  for all t  x
(with x > tm by A1), x is majority-preferred to any other government type x 2 U
(Median Voter Theorem). To establish the result, it su¢ ces to show that, for all
x 2 S, vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) implies vA (x; t)  vA (x; t) for all t > tm.
Consider rst a citizen t in region A. She prefers x to x 2 S if and only if
cu   jx  tj   csA   tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A ,
or, if t tm, equivalently,
t  jx  tj    tA  cA+ (1  )tm   A .
Since the left-hand side of the above inequality is strictly increasing in t if t < x
and constant in t if t  x, all citizens t > tm in region A strictly prefer x to x 2 S
whenever tm weakly prefers x to x.
By construction of x, citizens t  tB in region B are indi¤erent between x and
x 2 S (and therefore vote for x). Citizens t  tB in region B weakly prefer x to
x 2 S if and only if
cu   jx  tj   csB   tB   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  B , (6)
where the relationship holds with equality for t = tB by denition of x. The deriv-
ative of the left hand side with respect to t is strictly lower than the derivative of
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the right hand side when x  t < tB, proving that these individuals in region B
strictly prefer x to 2 S. Finally, consider citizens t < x in region B. Condition (6)
can be rewritten as
t   tB +cB  (1  )tm   x+ 2(1  )t+ B  0 .
Moreover vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) implies
m  (1 + )tm     tA  cA  x+ A  0 .
To complete case (i), it thus su¢ ces to check that t  m for all t 2 (tm; x):
t   m = 2(1  )t+   tA + tB  2tm +  (cB  cA) + B   A
> 2(1  ) (t  tm) > 0 .
(The rst inequality comes from the fact that tm is closer to tA than to tB.)
(ii) Suppose now that vA (x; tm) < vA (x; tm) for some (and therefore all) x 2 S.
We rst establish that the set of Condorcet winners is either S or fxg (and is
consequently nonempty). If the set of Condorcet winners does not coincide with S,
then there must exist a government type x 2 U that beats all the elements of S in
a pairwise majority vote (recall that citizens who are indi¤erent between separation
and unity with government type x are assumed to vote for x). We now claim that
this implies that x beats all the elements of S in a pairwise majority vote.
If x = x, the claim is trivial; so suppose that x 6= x. We want to prove that
citizens who prefer x to secession (i.e., to any element of S) must also prefer x to
secession. This is obvious for citizens t  x in region A and citizens t  tB in region
B, for they always prefer x to secession. All citizens t  (x+ x) =2 (in both regions)
prefer x to x. As a consequence, they prefer x to secession S whenever they prefer
x to the elements of S. Finally, consider a citizen t 2  (x+ x) =2; tB in region B:
As tm < x < t < tB,
cu   t+ x  cu   t+   tB  cB+ (1  )tm   B
= 
 
csB   tB + t

+ (1  ) (cu   t+ tm)  B + 2
 
tB   t
> 
 
csB   tB + t

+ (1  ) (cu   t+ tm)  B
which implies that she prefers x to secession. This proves that all members of
the majority preferring x to secession also prefer x to secession. As x is majority-
preferred to all y > x, it must be the unique Condorcet winner. This proves that
the set of Condorcet winners is either S or fxg.
We now establish that there exists a0 2 (a; a) such that the set of Condorcet
winners coincides with S whenever a  a0. To do so, we rst show that, for any
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x 2 S and any x0 2 U , vA (x; tm) > vA (x0; tm) if and only if vA (x; t) > vA (x0; t) for
all t  tm in region A. Consider a region A citizen with t < tm: she (strictly) prefers
x to x0 if and only if
cu   jx0   tj <  csA   tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A ,
or, equivalently,


t+
tA   t < x0   cA   (1  )tm   A .
As the left-hand side of the above inequality is weakly increasing on [0; tm], this
proves that all citizens t  tm in region A strictly prefer x to x0. As vA(x; t)  
vA(x
0; t) is continuous in t, there exists  > 0 such that all region As inhabitants in
[tm; tm + ) also prefer x to x0. As Fa (tm + jA) is increasing in a and
(1  ) lim
a!a
Fa (t
m + jA)  (1  ) lim
a!a
Fa (0jA) = 1   > 1
2
,
there must exist a0 2 (a; a) such that the set of region As citizens in [0; tm + )
constitutes a majority of the population. This proves that any x 2 S beats any
x0 2 U , thus completing the proof of the lemma.
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